Introduction
Every firm has a competitive strategy, whether explicit or implicit, that is employed to gain a competitive advantage over competitors. In the malfunctioning market and institutional environment of China, more often than not, the competitive edge is gained through extensive personal connections (guanxi). Gift-giving is perhaps the most consequential method in creating and employing guanxi. On many occasions gift-giving is simply associated with bribing and corruption. However, this chapter illustrates that by approaching the ethically loaded and yet theoretically and, by definition, controversial issue of corruption from a gift-giving approach one is able to unearth the complicated logic, risks and advantages involved in Chinese business networks. Based on ethnographic data, this chapter attempts to provide an insider point of view on the complex mechanisms of gift-giving in Chinese businesses. It shows that, in expanding and utilizing guanxi networks in the increasingly competitive environment, Chinese businessmen are actively competing with each other by differentiating their gifts in the most imaginative ways, thus forming a hidden marketplace of gifts. The emphasis is laid on illustrating the prerequisite and exacting choreography, social mechanisms and logic of action of various forms of gift-giving practices, namely 'ordinary business gift', 'hand-grenades and machine guns' and 'guided missiles' as gifts, that take place behind the cloak of visible networking (guanxi). This chapter attempts to avoid the definitional pitfalls of corruption by approaching the issue from a gift-giving perspective.
This enables one not only to depict how, in the marketplace of gifts, agents seek competitive advantage over each other by deploying correct social behaviour, choosing the right gift; but also in the outcome, complicate Bourdiue's notion of time in gift-giving (Bourdieu, 1990) .
Why observe gift-giving and not corruption?
Contemporary research and the Press converge and point out that Chinese society operates through the realm of long-term and personal relationships, that is, guanxi. The reforms in China have not managed to create a reliable legal system. Thus, the officials still work in an arbitrary fashion, and so guanxi takes on an ever more important role as agents attempt to minimize uncertainties in society, on the one hand. Yet, on the other hand, guanxi is often seen as the root of corrupt practices in Chinese society. As a consequence, the Chinese themselves do not comprehend guanxi simply as the root of corruption, but rather refer to it in a more positivist manner as 'the science' or 'the art' of networking -guanxixüe. The suffix -xüe connotes the English suffix -logy, like in biology, which translates into Chinese as shengwuxüe.
Conducting an ethnographic fieldwork on gift-giving has certain advantages over inquiring upon corruption practices directly. The study of corruption is plagued with analytical and practical difficulties (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) . First, it is virtually impossible to agree on a workable definition of corruption. Most studies on corruption analyse the issue from a normative perspective. To discuss the issue in moral terms based on our Western bureaucratic ideals, which we assume to be universal, or to observe the question in other ethical terms that are not analytically neutral: we not only risk distorting observations of the phenomena, but we are also unlikely to further our understanding of how Chinese society is actually functioning. Second, it is difficult to empirically observe deeds of corruption in a scientifically meaningful way. This is particularly so in the case of China. In China, the judicial system is mercilessly dealing with corruption, even carrying out capital punishment, so the inquiry into the actual practices of corruption becomes indubitably infeasible. As a consequence, most of the studies on corruption in China deal with the question at the macro-level, without paying attention to the actual processes of bribing or of corruption. Furthermore, there is a tendency to concentrate attention on the wrongdoings at the top, or among the princelings of the Communist leaders (Goodman and Hooper, 1994) .
